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PREFACE 
This research was conducted under Missouri Agricultural Experiment 
Station Research Project No. 25, Analysis of Strategy and Structure Within 
the Livestock-Meat System. This study of customer behavior at the meat 
counter has the objective of increasing the understanding of all elements of the 
industry from producer to consumer. 
Supermarkets manipulate several variables over time and particularly ads 
and item prices as parts of a merchandising strategy. The major part of this 
case study is concerned with customer response to weekly variations in ads and 
prices for various meat items. The general magnitude of sales response of 
specific items to ads without price changes and to price changes with and with-
out ads is shown. Those responses are shown to differ between two supermar-
kets with different types of advertising-pricing patterns. A final part of the study 
examines customer response to price as an indication of quality in ground beef. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the multi-product retail food store, weekly featuring of selected items, 
by ads or price cuts or the two combined, may have as its goal an increased 
volume of sales of those items. Another possible short-term goal is to increase 
storewide sales. The premise is that customers who are induced to shop for the 
featured items will do other buying as well. But merchandising strategy has 
longer term objectives, too. One, prosaic but important, may be to call attention 
repeatedly to the store's presence in the market. A fourth possible purpose 
may be to build a certain image of the store as to price competitiveness, quality 
and depth of its product line, convenience, friendliness of its personnel, etc. [ 1, 
pp. 89-95]. All these purposes are part of an overall objective of promoting 
maximum total sales and profits. 
Selective reduction of prices may be the familiar price "special"-a term 
used to describe prices reduced briefly (a week or a weekend) and then restored 
to their regular level. Nelson and Preston developed a broader concept of vari-
able-price merchandising. They described it as "the simultaneous and sequen-
tial manipulation of selected prices upward and downward in order to draw at-
tention to the market offerings of the firm and to differentiate them from 
those of its competitors" [7, p. 4]. The concept goes beyond the concept of 
the special by including both raising and lowering of price, by questioning 
the idea o(a "regular" price, and by including price changes of varying 
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length . While one might presume that price reductions may better "draw at-
tention" if advertised, Nelson and Preston focused on price changes while 
observing that there were some unadvertised price changes and some ads with un-
changing prices [7, p. 5]. 
This paper is based upon detailed data collected on prices and weekly 
movement for most meat items in two medium-size supermarkets for 7 weeks 
in one and 8 weeks in the other. The two markets--one a unit of a large local 
chain and the other an affiliate of a wholesale group--were about 2 miles 
apart in the same general type of residential area in the suburbs of a large 
Midwestern metropolitan area. 1 The two supermarkets employed differing 
strategies of pricing and of advertising. This paper focuses upon customer 
response to these differing strategies insofar as it could be measured by the 
short-term data available. Such responses should be of interest to those inter-
ested in consumer behavior or in retail merchandising strategies. While per-
haps of some interest to the general economist, these customer responses in a 
store are considerably removed from the normal measures of demand elastic-
ity. 
Store I developed an everyday reasonable-price image by advertising re-
peatedly numerous meat items at quite competitive prices. Few of the meat 
items in its ads exhibited price changes and not many of the price changes 
were advertised, although a few were weekly specials (Table 1). 
TABLE 1 -- AVERAGE WEEKLY NUMBER OF ADS AND PRICE CHANGES.!/ 
BY STORE 
Price Up: Total Items 
Away from Modal Price 
Toward Modal Price 
Price Down: Total Items 
A way from Modal Price 
Toward Modal Price 
Ads- Mentions with Price Cut 
Ads-Mentions with Price Unchanged 
Ads- Mentions with Price Raised 
,!/ Price in Week t compared to price in Week t-1. 
store I 
7 
1 
6 
8 
7 
1 
3 
19 
1 
store II 
14 
4 
10 
11 
9 
2 
4 
2 
0.3 
Store II relied much more upon weekly specials. Items did not appear re-
peatedly in the ads . A majority of the ad items were price reductions-usually 
for that week only. The general level of all meat prices was about 7 percent 
higher in Store II than in Srore I, but the advertised price reductions aver-
aged considerably larger in Store II. Store II , during the study period, made 
more price changes than Store I, and conformed a bit more closely to the 
VPM model. Thus, Store II did move prices of an average of four items per 
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week above their regular level at the same time it reduced prices of nine items 
below their regular prices. The price-changing pattern of Store I was more 
nearly a matter of temporary price reductions (Table 1). 
ITEM SALES RESPONSE 
To what extent was a sales change associated with a price change? To what 
extent was inclusion of the item2 in the weekly ad, with or without a price re.: 
duction, associated with a sales increase? 
Price Changes, With and Without Ads 
Uhl's results with studies of consumer perception of food price changes 
suggest that responsiveness is likely to be greater to advertised price changes 
than to those not advertised. His results also suggest a greater sensitivity· to 
price increases than to price decreases [ 12] . 
In both supermarkets, price changes were made ordinarily on Wednesday 
to coincide with Wednesday ads. Most prices were restored after a one-week 
change. 3 Most price changes were reductions initially, so most price increases 
were the aftermath of a one-week reduction (Table 1). 
Table 2 provides examples of the kind of item response data available in 
this study . Such data are of interest to store management as they plan their 
TABLE 2 -- SALES RESPONSES TO PRICE CHANGES, WITH AND WITHOUT ADS, 
SELECTED ITEMS 
Prices* Pounds Sold 
Week Week Modal Ad in Week Week 
t-1 t week t t-1 t Elasticity 
store I 
Chicken Legs 75 59 75 yes 67 113 -2.1 
Split Broilers 47 38 47 yes 53 433 -7.4 
Spare Ribs 89 79 89 no 192 134 +3.0 
Delmonico steaks 209 199 209 no 54 76 -6.9 
Center Chuck Roast 68 74 68 yes 104 86 -2.2 
Ham Butt 39 49 49 yes 175 265 +1.8 
Top Round Rst. B.O. 129 149 129 no - 47 30 -3.1 
store II 
! Pork Loin 89 69 89 yes 223 560 -3.4 
Ham Slice B. O. 119 99 119 yes 116 472 -6.6 
Polish Sausage 95 69 95 yes 67 120 -1.8 
Fam Pak Ground Beef 65 59 65 no 658 818 -2.2 
Arm Roast 109 99 109 no 74 49 +4.2 
Cut-up Fryer 29 39 53 no 377 421 +0.4 
BJade Chuck Steak 59 82 85 no 104 64 -1.5 
Cut-up Fryer 39 53 53 no 421 266 -1.5 
Pot Roast B. 0. 129 149 129 no 49 35 -2.3 
*Prices are cents per pound. 
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advertising and pricing patterns. Item sales responses are not the whole story, 
of course. Special prices and ads are part of an overall promotion of the whole 
market basket, and item responses, alone, are not a full measure of store sales 
response to promotion. 
The customer responses to about three out of every four advertised price 
cuts were elastic4 (Table 3). A majority of these elastic responses fell in the 
range of -2.0 to -7.0. The maximum elasticity was -10.9. When price cuts 
went unadvertised, only one-half elicited an elastic response and a surprising 
38 percent had reductions in quantities sold. Responses to price increases 
without ads tended to be greater (a higher proportion of elastic responses and 
fewer positive responses) than responses to price decreases without ads (Table 
3). Thus the greater responsiveness to advertised price changes and to (unad-
vertised) price increases as compared to decreases are both consistent with 
Uhl's findings [ 12]. 
TABLE 3 -- IMMEDIATE SALES RESPONSES TO PRICE CHANGES AND ADS 
Percentage of Quantity Responses 
Opposite to Price Change Same as 
Store Price-Ad Total More than Less than Price Change 
Stimulus Observation Proportionate Proportionate 
I Cut-Ads 20 55.0% 25.0% 20.0% 
II Cut-Ads 22 95.5 0.0 4.5 
Total 42 76.2 11.9 11. 9 
I Cut-No Ads 35 45.7 11.4 42.9 
II Cut-No Ads 44 54.5 11.4 34.1 
Total 79 50.6 11.4 38.0 
I Raise-No Ads 44 65.9 9.1 25.0 
II Raise-No Ads 85 63.5 13.0 23.5 
Total 129 64.3 11.7 24.0 
Notes: Data summarize responses in quantity in termi;; of changes from preceding 
week to current week on an individual-item basis, as associated with the specific 
direction of price change on each item, and according to whether or not it was 
advertised. Observations were excluded when sales were zero in either week since 
this usually reflected a decision not to stock the item, rather than consumer response. 
Items were generally excluded unless the total range in weekly sales was at least 
25 pounds. 
It is clear that the advertising of price cuts tended to increase customer 
response. One of the most dramatic illustrations of response to ads was a two-
consecutive-week price reduction of whole broilers in Store II. In week 2, 
price was cut from 39 to 29 cents a pound. In week 3, the 29 cents was main-
tained but was advertised for the first time. Weekly sales for weeks 1 to 3 
were 219, 17 4, and 2, 3 7 6 pounds, respectively. 5 In view of this kind of dra-
matic response, why did some ads-a minority-bring little response? One 
can hypothesize explanations such as more attractive ads in competing stores, 
or consumer failure to perceive that the ad represented a price cut. 
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These measurements of customer response should be interpreted in terms 
of the narrow situation described. Each one refers to a change between two 
consecutive weeks for a single item. However, there were five items for which 
a single price change was made near the middle of the period of observation 
and continued thereafter, so that average sales for 4 weeks before the price 
change could be compared with average sales for four weeks after. The elas-
ticities computed for this longer period had considerably less dispersion than 
those from the immediate responses (Table 4). The two positive elasticities of 
the week to week measurements did not carry over the eight-week period 
measurement; elasticities for the latter measurement were less in the other 
three cases. 6 
TABLE 4 -- SHORTER AND LONGER PERIOD SALES RESPONSES 
Weeks Immediate Whole Period 
Item Price Change Advertised Elasticity Elasticity 
(1) Center Chuck 68~ to 74¢ 1,2,3,4,5 -2.2 -0.8 
Roast 
(2) Arm Roast 88¢ to 94¢ 1,2,3,4,5 +3.7 -2.6 
(3) 7-Bone Roast 78¢ to 84¢ none -1. 3 0.0 
(4) Sirloin Steak 137¢ to 134¢ 2,4,5,7,8 +2.8 -1.2 
(5) Whole Broilers 43¢ to 39¢ none -6.0 -3.2 
Note: Price change was made between weeks 4 and 5, except for item (5) which was 
between weeks 5 and 6. 
Advertising Without Price Change 
Store II occasionally, and Store I more frequently, advertised items for a 
single week without a price change. Of 23 observations, 13 had an increase in 
sales and 10 a decrease, comparing the week of the ad with a previous week of 
no ad. Ads without price cuts did not appear to have been a dependable shorc-
term stimulant to the sales of the items listed, although they may have con-
tributed to other goals. 
AGGREGATE SALES RESPONSE 
Since it has been demonstrated that ads and price changes influenced sales 
of individual items in a majority of instances (Table 3), were the weekly vari-
ations in total sales of species of meat associated with variations in the total 
number of items which had price changes and/or appeared in the ads? To a 
considerable extent, yes. Most of the see-saw variations in the pork and beef 
sales totals of weeks 3 to 7 in Store II (Figure 1) were the kinds expected to be 
associated with the changes in ads and prices. For example, in week 4, the 
number of pork ads increased, there were more pork price decreases than in-
creases, and pork sales were up. Comparison of stores I and II also supports 
the thesis. Store I generally had fewer and smaller weekly fluctuations in its 
8 Missouri Agricultural Experiment Station 
beef and pork sales totals. It had much greater stability in its total number of 
ads for pork and beef, and it made fewer price changes. 
Total meat department weekly sales were affected noticeably by "specials" 
on one occasion in each store (Figure 1). Note that the week to week vari-
ations in total dollar sales in each store were typically less than 5 percent . It 
seems likely that larger fluctuations in the number of ads and in prices would 
have produced larger variations in weekly total meat sales than recorded here. 
The advantages of such fluctuations to a meat department are not obvious 
while the accompanying managerial problems of inventoty control and labor 
scheduling are apparent. Thus , it is quite likely that both stores generally 
restricted their actions so as not to generate sharp fluctuations in weekly sales. 
Store I's repetitive ads and relatively few specials were consistent with sta-
bility of total sales. Store II had greater instability because of its greater de-
pendence upon specials; its coefficient of variation of total weekly tonnage 
was nearly twice that of Store I. 
SALES 
(Lbs. & $) 
20,000 -------------
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15,000 
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Figure 1. . . Weekly Sales by Category 
Response to Store Strategy 
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There is evidence suggesting that customers in each supermarket under-
stood the general nature of these prevailing advertising-pricing patterns. The 
response in the two stores to advertised price cuts was quite different. In Store 
II, where 58 percent of the advertised items had price cuts, 95. 5 percent of 
RESEARCH BULLETIN 1006 9 
the sales responses to such specials were elastic. In contrast, in Store I, where 
only 13 percent of the ad items were price cuts, only 55 .0 percent of the re-
sponses to the specials were elastic (Table 3). There was no difference in the 
two stores as to response to price increases and little difference in their response 
to unadvertised price-cuts. Thus, the customers seemed to differ not in their 
response to price changes, but in their awareness of them. Store II customers 
had found that they could rely more on the ads to shop for "bargains." 
PRICE AS AN INDEX OF QUALITY 
The study produced incidental observations on the topical issue of wheth-
er customers who find it difficult to judge quality of a product accurately may 
tend to rely upon price and other guides furnished by merchandisers [5, 8, 
11]. Ground beef appears to be an excellent example of such behavior. Store I 
had four categories of ground beef listed in ascending order of price as ground 
beef, ground chuck, ground round and ground sirloin. Store II lacked ground 
sirloin. These categories, as they are commonly used across the country, are 
generally understood by meat merchandisers to refer to leanness rather than 
muscle origin. These particular muscle origins are meaningless as indications 
of eating quality of a ground product, and it is common knowledge that meat 
departments have generally not felt bound by these designations in running 
their grinders [2,6] . Thus the cost of the ground beef is virtually a linear 
function of its percentage of leanness. Likewise, the intrinsic quality of 
ground beef is a direct function of its percentage of lean meat. Therefore, 
these customers paid far more for meat in the leaner categories than was justi-
fied by their content (Table 5). While sales of the lowest priced ground beef 
were larger, large quantities of ground chuck and ground round, and even 87 
pounds per week of chopped sirloin were sold. Store I did so much more suc-
cessful a merchandising job than Store II with these higher priced cuts that it 
realized 5 cents (6.8%) a pound more on total ground beef sales. This was 
done even though it priced each item at or below the price charged by Store 
II. It's always possible to argue that consumers received more psychic satis-
faction from eating ground round than the cheaper gound beef. If not, then 
purchasers of expensive ground beef paid considerable for their lack of product 
knowledge. 
TABLE 5 -- INDEX VALUES OF QUALITY AND PRICE DIFFERENCES 
Leanness Store Prices 
Item Value II 
Ground Beef 100 100 100 
Ground chuck 105 122 122 
Ground round 110 137 136 
Chopped sirloin 115 150 NA 
Note: The value differences correspond to average differences in leanness claimed 
by the stores. Published reports indicate that such differences are typically less 
[2.6]. 
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The empirical example above has a textbook parallel. Scitovsky argues that 
sellers in an uninformed market will frequently find it profitable to engage in 
just such price discrimination, where "differences in prices are out of propor-
tion to differences in quality" [ 10, p. 477]. He argues further that such situa-
tions may lead co a leveling effect on consumers' welfare if-to return co our 
example--higher income consumers buy mainly the higher priced ground beef 
and lower income consumers buy mainly the cheaper [ 10, Ch. 25]. The rela-
tive incomes of the buyers were not available in this study to verify that as-
sumption. However, it is plausible that this pricing practice in ground beef 
encouraged the supermarkets to price their cheapest ground beef lower than 
they would have if they had not price discriminated so successfully with 
ground chuck, ground round, etc. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
About 62 percent of the sales responses to an unadvertised price cut for a 
week on a meat item were elastic in an eight-week study in two supermarkets. 
The percentages of elastic response were higher when the price cuts were ad-
vertised. The responsiveness to advertised price cuts was much higher in Store 
II than Store I. Store II with a generally higher level of meat prices, consis-
tently had sizeable price cuts in a majority of its ads. On the other hand, 
Store I advertised relatively few price cuts in its ads. The total evidence sug-
gests that customers generally responded in the expected direction to price 
changes of which they were aware, and that awareness of price cuts was much 
higher with the advertising-pricing pattern of Store II. 
Week to week variations in total dollar sales of meat were typically less 
than 5 percent in each store. Store I's advertising-pricing pattern was accom-
panied by rather stable weekly sales of beef, pork, and poultry. Store II had 
larger fluctuations of beef, pork, and poultry sales but generally balanced a 
pork sale with higher beef prices, and vice versa, resulting in mostly offsetting 
sales fluctuations. Store II's version of variable price merchandising with its 
greater relative fluctuations in the sales of most items and of most aggregates 
resulted in more inventory and labor management problems than Store I's 
version of variable price merchandising. 
As a side result, ground beef was found to be a good example of the situa-
tion in which uninformed consumers rely upon name and pricing guides fur-
nished by merchandisers. Both stores were quite successful-and store I espe-
cially so--in selling the leaner types of ground beef (ground chuck, round, 
sirloin) at prices considerably out of proportion to their relative leanness. 
These results have the limitations of all case studies. They are not gener-
alizable to a statistical population. On the other hand, the results are based on 
empirical data that has seldom been available to public researchers. The in-
ferences are generally consistent with findings of related research. Moreover, 
in the multi-variate world of U. S. food retailing, the limitations listed above 
apply in much the same degree to all existing studies. Thus, these results are 
submitted, not as definitive answers, but as a few more pieces of evidence. 
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Footnotes 
1 Details of research procedure are available from the senior author. 
2
"Item" refers co che most specific unit idencifiable--e.g ., ground round in I pound packages; "category" 
refers co common groupings such as ground beef or pork loins; "species" refers to beef, pork and poultry. 
3Wholesale meat prices were quite stable during the srudy period (summer 1971). 
4
"Elasticicy" as used in chis paper refers co the simple ratio of percentage change in quantity over percent-
age change in price from one period co the next. The measures computed should not be interpreted as de-
mand elasticities in the usual sense; there were no adjustments for variation in other factors in order co 
estimate specific demand functions. This paper deliberately refers co customer response or sales response 
rather than co demand elasticities. Direcr comparisons are obviously not applicable with published elas-
ticities for beef, pork, or poultry based on long term national aggregates , nor even with the retail elas-
ticities of Dooley or Holdren (3,4] . Holdren's analysis for example, involved observations of price differ-
ences in an index of 46 grocery items in one score versus its numerous competitors . While these results are 
somewhat comparable co Purcell and Raunikar's [9] pork and beef elasticities of demand computed from 
weekly panel data, there are important differences in models and their results apply co a given sec of con-
sumers while the weekly secs of customers in a score vary in an unknown manner. 
5From the scores' point of view, consumer response was so large in week 3 as co cue severely into the meat 
department gross margin for chat week and into the gross margin on broilers for che whole period. 
6These results appear consistent with Purcell and Raunikar's findings chat price elasticities over longer 
periods were generally lower than chose for week co week changes [9] . Week co week responses are prob-
ably greater because the price changes are expected by many customers co be temporary . 
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